For Ethics in War Conference
First Draft USMA, West Point March 27, 2015 March 12, 2015
DEATH SQUADS AND DEATH LISTS: TARGETED KILLING AND THE CHARACTER OF THE STATE
Jeremy Waldron 1 1. Targeted killing as a topic My topic is targeted killing-the officially authorized and premeditated killing by military or intelligence officials of named and identified individuals without the benefit of any judicial process.
2 American killings of this kind take place as part of what we call the war on terror or the global war against terrorism. 3 There have been thousands of such killings. 4 The killings are authorized within the national security structure, under the command of the President of the United States and his high national security councils and officials. They are deliberate killings of named, identified individuals at times and places of our choosing, sometimes by squads of special forces on the ground in various countries (like the killing of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan), 5 but most often from the sky by unmanned armed aerial vehicles (or drones), flying over countries like Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and Yemen, which fire missiles at identified individual targets. Sometimes friends, family, and acquaintances of the named individuals are killed as well in these drone strikes. Our drones fire at a car with several passengers, for example, or at a wedding or family gathering where the identified target is present. We refer to these additional killings impersonally as "collateral damage"-though more accurately these are foreseen but unintended killings that accompany the intended killings of the named targets.
Also sometimes our drones pass over areas like insurgent or terrorist training camps where, it is presumed, any young man present especially if he is armed is deemed a legitimate target whether he has been specifically identified or not. For some reason, we refer to these killings-which don't involve the targeting of named individuals-as "signature strikes." Signature strikes raise all sorts of issues. But they are not my subject here today. I want to talk specifically about the deliberate killing of named and identified individuals by our forces and I want to reflect on some distinctive aspects of the use of lethal force by the state that this practice of targeted killing represents. I believe it raises important issues that we have to confront about the normalization of individualized targeted killing as a practice used by the state.
I emphasize at the outset that my topic includes but is not limited to killings by drones. In all sorts of ways, drone warfare is interesting and unique. But for my purposes here today, we should regard drone killings as part of a broader category of targeted killings, which include the use of death squads on the ground as well as drones in the air. 6 Considered more broadly as a category that includes activity by countries other than the United States, targeted killing may also comprise the use "sniper fire, … missiles from helicopters, gunships, … the use of car bombs, and poison…." the death lists. Names on these lists are ranked according to the prioritization of their destruction. From time to time, as the opportunity presents itself, names are taken up from this list or lists and assigned to officials who arrange for the killing of the named individuals, usually by drone strikes from the air or by the use of death squads on the ground. 9 2. No distractions As already indicated, what I am going to say about targeted killing will proceed on a pretty narrow front. There are of course all sorts of issues with the practice. 10 Many critics are concerned about the effect of targeted killing on innocent civilians-what we sometimes refer to as "collateral damage." They seek assurances-or they wonder whether it is possible to give assurances-that people will not be injured or killed in targeted killings who are not actually those being targeted.
Some critics worry too about the process by which individuals are targeted. They wonder whether the right names are on the death lists. They ask about the integrity of the process by which names are added to the lists and chosen for targeting. Are there proper processes for reviewing and vetting the death lists, and for taking names off a list as well as adding names?
I shall not pursue either of these points. Pursued in isolation, each of these criticisms seems to assume that if only we could be sure that the names on the death list were really those of the "bad guys," or if only we could be sure that the targeted bad guys and only the targeted bad guys were being killed, then there not be a problem with targeted killing-or there would be much less of a problem.
Each of these issues does define a problem with targeted killing as it is currently practiced by the United States and other powers, and someone needs to think about them. But they do not get at the problem with targeted killing. The central issue, from which we must not flinch in our reflections on this practice, is not whether we are killing the right people but whether killings of this kind are appropriate at all. The issue is the sheer existence and use of such death-lists by our government, however scrupulously and transparently they are maintained.
The same can be said about issues like infringements of sovereignty that are involved in targeted killings. 11 Of course this is not just an issue for drones.
The targeted killing of Osama bin Laden by a team of Navy SEALs in 2011 involved an unauthorized incursion into Pakistan by an American death squad. Once again: the violation of sovereignty in some of these cases is an issue, and someone ought to be concerned with it. But it is not the issue. For even if we were working only in our own sovereign territory or in the territory of a friendly power that was happy to accommodate our death squads, 12 there would still be an issue about targeted killing.
And there are a host of other side issues.
For example, people criticize the targeting of American citizens in these killings, like the killing of Anwar Al-Awlaki in Yemen in September 2011 -a criticism pursued as though the practice of targeted killing would not be so bad if the only names on the death lists were the names of foreigners.
People worry about the use of drones as a new form of warfare, which seems finally to abandon any element of chivalry or reciprocity in combat:
13 the vulnerability of targeted individuals to drone strikes from the air is now Morrow, 1990 ). Valentine's figure is 25,000 assassinations; Andrade's view is that the number of assassinations was much, much lower than that. 13 Camus -"you can't kill unless you are prepared to die." (Chamayou 153-4) the suggestion that maybe the privilege of killing depends on reciprocity (Chamayou 161-2).
coupled with the complete invulnerability of those who are operating the unmanned armed aerial vehicles, often from thousands of miles away. The concern is that this presages utterly new forms of armed conflict, for which new rules, ethics, and customs will be necessary.
Some worry about the drone and drone technology itself and the way it presages a new era of surveillance-yet another new era of surveillancefrom the skies.
14 These are all important issues about targeted killings and it is good that people are pursuing them. But their pursuit should not be allowed to distract us from the main issue, which is the adoption of a new practice of individualized killing by our government: the maintenance of death lists and the use of death squads. It is the targeting that concerns me-the hunting down and killing of individuals named and identified on a list as being marked for death, and the maintenance of such lists, setting out an apparently never-ending agenda for our death squads.
Of course, in the last resort, it is the killings themselves that are the issue. Human individuals are targeted for death and hunted down and killed. These practices are homicidal, though many have convinced themselves that they are privileged by the laws of armed conflict or, in a less formal sense, privileged as a matter of national self-defense. 15 The homicidal character of these practices ought to invoke the most serious reflection and consideration of the kind of country we are becoming (or have been forced to become) in the war on terror. It is not just a matter of thinking hard so that we can "come up with" a justification for targeted killing. There are all sorts of things that we might justify that nevertheless would reflect badly on us as a community or reflect badly on our political system. Whatever the provocation, whatever the justification, we must ask ourselves whether we want to become the kind of country that maintains death lists and sends out death squads. Do we want this to become a permanent feature of state practice? Do we want it to become a permanent capability available in principle to any of the 192 sovereign states in the world that think of themselves as having particular persons as enemies?
The terminology of "death lists" and "death squads"
The language I am using-"death squads" and "death lists"-is ugly and emotive, and it will upset many people who are otherwise comfortable with the practice of targeted killing. But the terminology is not ugly and emotive because of any way I have embellished it. The phrases are crude and to the point: they are, as are these practices, about death. And they simply mention the fact that lists are maintained by the state for people marked for death and that the killings are carried out designated squads of military and/or intelligence people either operating on the ground or remotely operating the machinery of death in the air. It is not possible to quibble with the literal meaning of these brutal phrases or their application to the practice we are considering.
The terminology is ugly nonetheless because of its connotations. "Death lists" and "death squads" make our national security and military apparatus sound sinister and brutal, like the tools used by Latin American dictatorships years ago: in El Salvador in the early 1980s for example. They conjure up images of informal teams of brutal men, operating in a partly clandestine partly visible way, under the deniable orders of a ruthless regime, to kill-and make an example of the killingof opponents of the regime in the cities and in the countryside as an alternative to negotiating with them or respecting their human rights or allowing them to take part in national politics. (I shall call these "classic cases" of death squads and death lists.) I make no apology for these connotations. The resemblance (such as it is) between our targeted killing and these brutal practices-both covered under the terminology of "death lists' and "death squads"-is a salutary reminder of the sort of the sort of state we may be turning into. I mean a state in which this sort of killing is a standard way of dealing with those whose continued existence is deemed unacceptable to the governing regime.
I make nothing of allegations that the United States, historically, was complicit in the organization and activity of death squads in Central and South America in the 1980s. 16 For the killings themselves, all sorts of euphemisms are used. "Take out" and "eliminate' are used by officials who want to sound hard but don't want to say "put to death." As for other terminology, Philip Alston notes that "'leadership decapitation,' … captures only some of the practices at stake"; 'assassinations,' has become a term of art and may be a distraction; and 'extrajudicial executions,' … has the downside of building per se illegality into the description of the process. The Israelis have urged the use of terms like "preventive killing," and "targeted pre-emptive actions. When the terminology of "death lists" and "death squads" is used, it is sometimes used in connection with concerns that I sought to exclude as the 21 Others use the terminology to get to the heart of the matter. So, for example, conservative law professor Robert Delahunty worries about the administration's brushing aside objections to the practice. Referring to former State Department legal advisor Harold Koh, he says:
If Koh returns to the legality of targeted killing of al Qaeda and Taliban terrorist suspects, he should deal far more adequately with the human rights objection that targeting an un-uniformed combatant is akin to outlawing and sentencing him without trial-something more like killing individuals by paramilitary death squads than ordinary military combat. In my opinion, there are legally and morally persuasive answers to that objection. But the problem is a serious one that deserves something more than Koh's shallow and evasive response.
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Various journalists, especially outside the United States, have shown no reluctance to use the terminology of "death squads." Seamus Milne of The Guardian in London talks of drone crews as "hi-tech death squads," 32 and says of special forces on the ground in Afghanistan, "What emerges is both the scale of covert killings by US special forces-running 20 raids a night at one point in Afghanistan-and the unmistakable fact that these units are operating as death squads, whose bloodletting is dressed up as "targeted killings" of terrorists and insurgents for the benefit of a grateful nation back home. Post tells his readers that "American strategists sponsor death squads in Afghanistan and Pakistan" and that "[t]he aim is to terrorize the masses by drone attacks and death squads."
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I mention these uses of what I have acknowledged is ugly and emotive language not to validate what I am saying in this paper, but to indicate that it is not coming entirely "out of the blue," particularly so far as foreign observers are concerned. The characterization of our targeted killing practices in terms of "death lists" and "death squads" is not uncommon; it needs to be taken seriously and confronted squarely without evasion.
Differences and disanalogies?
Are American practices of targeted killing redeemed perhaps by the many differences that distinguish them from the classic case of death squads in (say) El Salvador in the early 1980s? Certainly many differences can be cited, and it is worth reflecting on their significance.
Some differences are trivial, albeit colorful. We think of the classic death squad as a poorly disciplined bunch of brutal and unshaven men in sweaty uniforms, cruel and sadistic in their actions and mentality beyond perhaps what their assignment requires. But deodorant and air-conditioning (in a trailer in Nevada or Langley used by drone operators) take us only so far. It is true that no one accuses drone operators of sadism, and the brutality that their actions involve is simply the brutality of the lethal means they use for quick and devastating strikes. But these are surely inessential differences.
Is this true of the contrast between disciplined and undisciplined forces? In some ways, yes. For a while, American drone operators were acting outside the military chain of command, involving intelligence operatives rather than or as well as military personnel. Strictly speaking, such intelligence operatives would count as unlawful combatants, unless they were somehow legitimately patched into military units. True, this is not the sort of indiscipline we envisage in the classic paradigm. It may still be important because it illustrates that targeted killings by our government have not always conformed to a strict military model.
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In a recent collection of essays on death squads by a group of anthropologists, Jeffrey Sluka suggests that in classic death squads, the mix of personnel is between military, police, and intelligence personnel on the one hand, and "paramilitary civilian groups," on the other. 37 But his point in emphasizing the mixed character of the groups is to reconcile the fact that "death squads are usually directly or indirectly under official or unofficial state control," being "generally and secretly fully integrated into the state's regular security network," while at the same time establishing sufficient distance between the group and the formal and publicly recognized apparatus of the regime to allow for "plausible deniability."
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Death squads, in the classic paradigm, are kind of half-legitimate. They are associated with the state but not publicly avowed by the state. This twilight character of death squads in the classic paradigm may be an important feature and we should note it as a possible point of distinction from the practice of targeted killing with which we are concerned. Whether this difference is diminished by the use of state secrecy and concealment in the early years of the American practice (until denial of targeted killing became politically impossible), is likely to be a matter of dispute.
In the classic paradigm, the killings carried out by death squads are "politically motivated murders" of political opponents of the regime, carried out in the regime's own territory.
39 This is a major difference. As far as I am aware, targeted killings by our forces have never taken place in American territory and, even when they have been directed at American citizens, they have taken place in foreign countries and have been motivated by concerns about terrorism rather than domestic political opposition. American use of targeted killing has not been pursuant to any domestic political agenda associated with political authoritarianism as it is in many of the classic cases. In Sluka's account, however, the authoritarian element is not essential; the use of death squads is typical, he says, of "national security states" as well as authoritarian states. 40 And the contrast between the killing of terrorists by US death squads and the killing of political opponents in the classic model is complicated by two points. First, targeted killing is used by the US not just to impact members of bona fide terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda, but also against insurgents rising up against our forces or against the regimes that we have been trying to establish in Afghanistan and Iraq. So, for example, although the Taliban has had strong connections with Al Qaeda in the past, the use of targeted killings against Taliban leaders is related mainly to their violent attempt to overthrow the US-sponsored regime in Kabul or to establish pockets or regions of resistance to its authority. In that endeavor, the Taliban use methods that can be labelled terroristic and the same 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid., p. 2. 40 Cite to Sluka.
can certainly be said about ISIS and other insurgent forces in Syria and Iraq. But whether these violent insurgents can plausibly be labelled terrorists or not, they are plainly not terrorists in a sense that would distinguish them importantly from political opponents of regimes we are supporting or political opponents of our presence in the countries in which they operate.
It might be said that in the classic paradigm, death squads target the political opponents of a regime whether they are engaged in armed struggle or not, and that that element of the indiscriminate use of force is the key to a distinction, not the applicability of the label "terrorist." In the classic case, death squads target armed and unarmed political opponents indiscriminately, whereas our practices of targeted killing are focused on combatants (usually unlawful combatants). I don't think we should ignore this distinction, but nor should we exaggerate it. Consider the killing of Anwar Al-Awlaki, the American citizen operating in Yemen, whom I have alluded to a couple of times. A case can be made that Al-Awlaki was a bad person, whose activities were certainly not in the interests of the United States: he was an able propagandist and recruiter and he incited terroristic actions. He was not, as far as I know, a combatant. Targeting him would be like targeting a high enemy civilian official in a regular war. 41 Also, beyond members of terrorist and insurgent organizations, we should note that in Afghanistan at least, targeted killings have been used against drug lords, probably on account of their connections to the opponents of the regime rather than simply as a narcotics control measure.
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(I will want to return to this issue of the breadth of targeting and the malleability of the label "terrorist" in section 8, when we consider the possible use of death lists and targeted killing by regimes other than the United States if this catches on as a respectable form of state practice.)
The sub-title of the book that Jeffrey Sluka edited is "The Anthropology of State Terror." He and his fellow authors believe that classic death squads are used by authoritarian or national security regimes not just to eliminate their political 41 Some philosophers have suggested that the rule against targeting such civilians has no justification: see, e.g. I said at the beginning that I didn't intend to dwell on the element of "collateral damage," important though it is. In the present context, it does help diminish the difference between death squads as an element of state terrorism and targeted killings as a means of cowing as well as killing the inhabitants of certain areas.
In general: of course there are differences between the use of death squads in (say) El Salvador in the early 1980s and the use of targeted killing by American forces under the Obama presidency. There are always differences between any two sets of social/political/military phenomena. The differences do not necessarily preclude our arraying them under the same classification. Everything depends on whether the differences are differences of detail, or differences that go to the essence of the concept under discussion. Or-if one eschews essentialismeverything depends on whether the differences seriously diminish the point that is supposed to be made by arraying both sets of practices under the same term.
It is not my argument that the American practice of targeted killing is the exact equivalent of the activities of outfits we call "death squads," either sociologically or morally. My position is that the American practice is much more like such activities than we ought to be comfortable with, and that the classification of our practice in the same category as classic cases of death squads and death lists may be salutary in our reflections upon our own practices.
I say all this because, when comparisons and analogies are made in regard to features of American practice or policy, the indignant complaint is often heard: "Are you saying these practices are morally equivalent?" People say this without much idea of what the phrase "morally equivalent" means.
If the question is supposed to be, "Is the one set of practices as bad or as evil as the other?" one can answer, I think, "Probably not." Tens of thousands of people were killed by El Salvadorian death squads, and only thousands (not tens of thousands) have been killed so far by America's targeted killings, and the terroristic and authoritarian element was no doubt much worse in the former case.
But if the "moral equivalence" question means something like, "Does the one set of practices raise the same sort of concerns as the other?" the answer may be "Yes." For in both cases there are concerns of exactly the same kind about the state's relation to these killings: the killings are extra-judicial, they stand in a problematic relation to privileged killings in combat, and they betoken a form of state practice-drawing up lists of enemies and trying to kill them one by onethat is radically at odds with how a democratic constitutional state, even one rigged for war and capital punishment, is supposed to operate.
Justifying targeted killing
The question about moral equivalence might also be taken to mean: "Is targeted killing just like the activity of Salvadorian death squads in this respect-that there is no justification for the activity?" No one thinks that the activities of Salvadorian death squads were justified (though it is said that the US kind-of supported them at the time). But most people believe it is possible to justify targeted killing by the present US administration. 47 All sorts of justifications are put forward. Some see targeted killing as just a limited instance of the killing of combatants in an armed conflict. Harold Koh, for example, former dean of the Yale Law School and formerly legal counsel in the State Department, maintained in a speech to the American Society of International Law in 2010 that as a matter of international law, the United States is in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda, as well as the Taliban and associated forces, in response to the horrific 9/11 attacks, and may use force consistent with its inherent right to self-defense under international law.
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Against this background he said it was appropriate to target individuals belonging to Al Qaeda as combatants, just as one would target soldiers in an opposing army. He rejected the idea that these targeted killings were extra-judicial executions, insisting that "a state that is engaged in an armed conflict or in legitimate selfdefense is not required to provide targets with legal process before the state may use lethal force." 49 And he brushed aside as irrelevant the distinction that targeted killing goes specifically after named individuals, whereas in ordinary warfare the killing of combatants is largely anonymous:
[S]ome have suggested that the very act of targeting a particular leader of an enemy force in an armed conflict must violate the laws of war. But 47 Cite opinion polls, indicating majority support for targeted killing as a tactic. There are all sorts of things one might say in response to this, to support the suggestion that the listing and specific targeting of individuals by name might be significant. of, say, fifteen members of the defending force, instructing you (if at all possible) to ensure that these individuals are killed in the course of the operation. Would one simply accept the list and shrug and say, "Well that's war; these people are enemy soldiers and they are liable to be targeted anyway"? Or would we expect alarmbells to go off in the mind of the company commander?
Why am I being given this list of names? I know they are all combatants, but why are these ones being singled out? Is it because their surviving the campaign will make post-bellum governance more difficult? Are they communists or fanatics of some other kind? Is it because of their background? Are they Jews? Is someone taking the opportunity presented by otherwise legitimate combat to settle a score? Or what?
Part of the worry no doubt is about the prospect for quarter so far as the named individuals are concerned. The company commander may worry: "Am I being told not to accept the surrender of any of the individuals on the list?" But even if quarter is not ruled out, the mere fact of the list and its presentation to the company commander would feel rum. 52 It would feel like some sort of abuse of military privilege, a distorting of military ethos. I am sure that Professor Koh can see the concern here and that he would not want to dismiss it out of hand. But if that's the case, then we can't say that the mere fact that the names on the list are legitimate combat targets anyway answers all of our concerns. There is something about the targeting of named individuals that ought to give us pause, particularly if it is adopted as a regular practice. Like Delahunty, I wish Koh had paused for more reflection on this aspect of the matter in his remarks to the American Society for International Law. 53 The point I want to make in this paper is that perhaps even if we can concoct a justification for targeted killing, we should distinguish between justifying he practice, in a narrow legalistic sense, and the broader issue of the misgivings we should feel about the character of the practice or the character of the statecraft that now uses these methods as a regular instrument of national policy. I worry that Professor Koh and others write as though, once a plausible or even just a presentable line of justification has been sketched out, there can be no further room for concern.
Much the same can be said about justifications concocted along a different line. Joseph de Maistre once remarked that " [w] Professor Biggar is surely right to insist on the category of "rough justice" and on its possible applications in warfare. 56 But justice can be "rough" in two senses. It can be rough in the sense that there was a rough version of the procedure that justice would ordinarily require. Or it can be rough in the sense that it omits any element of procedure whatsoever and assesses the killing purely on an outcome-basis. 57 A third line of justification that is sometimes heard is that targeted killings are justified as bare acts of self-defence, whether or not they conform (in whatever way) to justice paradigms or combat paradigms. Kenneth Anderson has put this forward as a substitute for the Harold Koh killing-of-combatants argument, which he regards as inadequate certainly by the terms of "the law of war treaties and customary law defining armed conflict." 58 The better approach to this, rather than a global war on terror …, is the customary law of self-defense. … That's the legal authority that permits the US to strike at its enemies whether in a combat theater or not, in safe havens far away from any regular battlefield, and it is the traditional authority on which the US has always relied. 59 Elsewhere, Anderson has called this justification "naked self-defense" because it does not claim the benefit of the complicated laws and customs of armed conflict. 60 was unnecessary because "we all know" bin Laden was guilty. And that is almost certainly right, though nevertheless it is worth reflecting on the fact that we have trials-even rough trialsbecause sometimes "things we all know" turn out to be false. I wish Professor Biggar had said something to this point. 58 Kenneth Anderson, '"More Predator Drone Debate, in the Wall Street Journal, and What the Obama Administration Should Do as a Public Legal Position," The Volokh Conspiracy, January 9, 2010, available at http://volokh.com/2010/01/09/more-predator-drone-debate-in-the-wallstreet-journal-and-what-the-obama-administration-should-do-as-a-public-legal-position/ I am gratefdul to Grégoire Chamayou, The Theory of the Drone, pp. 171-2, for this reference. 59 Ibid.
In my view, this is the most promising line of justification available, though some have questioned it and though there must be misgivings about the absence of any parameters of limits on the self-defense claim.
61 It has the advantage over the other lines of justification of not trying to turn targeted killing into anything else. It is what it is. After all, the American practice of targeted killing is not unmotivated-and the Anderson approach simply identifies the motivation and calls it the justification. That's an honest approach. I have said some critical things about some of these lines of possible justification. But those criticisms are not key to the argument of this paper. For, as I shall show in section 6, an action can be justified but still be the focus of concern as a state practice; legal objections to an action can be answered, but still the action considered as part of a settled practice can warrant further scrutiny and reflection.
Nevertheless, I began this section with a question, and we should answer it. Defective though (I think) some of them are, the justificatory arguments that we have rehearsed in this section are certainly more convincing than anything one might hear in defence of the activity of death squads in El Salvador in the early 1980s. So this is a ground of difference between the classic case of a death squad and this modern manifestation of the phenomenon.
In this regard, then, they are definitely not moral equivalents. But moral equivalence is not the basis for categorizing two phenomena under the same heading. Describing American targeted killings in terms of "death lists" and "death squads," using the same vocabulary as we use to describe El Salvadorian death lists and death squads from the early 1980s, may be salutary even if they are not moral equivalents. It may help us see something important about the former practice even if we have rejected the idea that it is the moral equivalent of the latter. 62 Sometimes it is helpful to align two non-morally-equivalent practices under the same disreputable heading. We do this all the time with words like "killing" and "undemocratic." Not everything that is properly described as a killing is the moral equivalent of everything else that can be properly described as a killing. Not everything that can be condemned as undemocratic is the moral equivalent of everything else that can be condemned as undemocratic.
6. The character of targeted killing I don't want to rule out the possibility that targeted killing or some instances of targeted killing might be justified. But what if they are? What if we have no alternative but to engage in killings of this kind as part of the global war against terrorism? We should still consider the kind of state that our (possibly justified) response to these exigencies is turning us into. And the language of "death squads" and "death lists" may be helpful in jolting us into this additional layer of consideration.
Concocting a moral or a legal justification of a practice is not all there is to a critical or evaluative assessment of it. Legal justifications, in particular, can sometimes seem narrow and even obtuse. They may be designed simply to block or answer particular legal objections, leaving broader ethical issues untouched. They can give the impression sometimes of being rigged. 63 Or in some cases justifications may address just one facet of an issue, without seeing what we might call the big picture. For example, a senior civil servant in the British Ministry of Defence has been quoted as saying that "[t]he use of unmanned aircraft prevents the potential loss of aircrew lives and is thus in itself morally justified." 64 But he can't mean that literally: he must have meant the avoiding loss of aircrew lives is one element that might factor into a justification, not that it is a complete justification in itself. More importantly, a justification does not necessarily reconcile us to the practice. For that we may want to consider its broader character: what more generally can be said about us and our practices in light of the fact that we have 63 Finkelstein, 'Targeted Killing as Preemptive Action,' in Finkelstein et al. (eds.) Targeted Killings, pp. 168-9, illustrates this with the following imaginary example:
Imagine we would like to target a head of state of a humane democracy. … [W]e have only to declare war on that country in order to convert the relationship [between our armed forces and that head of state] into one between belligerents, and although such a declaration would be impermissible from an ad bellum standpoint, it would entitle us to target the now-enemy head of state without subjecting ourselves to liability for war crimes. As long as the in bello criterion for the legitimacy of killing enemy combatants does not depend on the justice of our cause in declaring war in the first place, we can kill with impunity as long as we have committed the quite different wrongful act of engaging in a wrongful declaration or act of war. seized on and advanced this or that line of argument to justify action of a certain sort.
In ethics, we sometimes distinguish between the assessment of actions (in either deontological or consequentialist terms) and the assessment of character in terms of virtue ethics. They are not necessarily the same. A justified action may in certain circumstances reveal a bad character or a character of a certain sort that might not involve a favorable assessment. Sometimes, for example, we may describe a morally scrupulous person as a prig or a pedant. Sometimes we may have reason for avoiding the company of and not wanting to have anything to do with a person who has acted in a certain way, even when his so acting is justified.
Or consider classic cases of "dirty hands" in politics or in warfare. As Michael Walzer has pointed out, 65 sometimes we accept that certain actions that would normally be regarded as wrong actions or even atrocities must be undertaken by those who have responsibility for the security and well-being of a community even though such actions inevitably taint the character of those who feel compelled to undertake them. A president orders the nuclear bombing of an enemy city that doesn't involve a military target in order to end a war; or a politician orders the torture of a prisoner to get information that will help avoid some catastrophic horror that might arise in a ticking bomb situation. Even if we were to accept that such action was justified, we would not necessarily say that the character of the individual who undertook them was left untainted thereby. 66 Max Weber cites "Machiavelli [who] in a beautiful passage, if I am not mistaken, of the History of Florence, has one of his heroes praise those citizens who deemed the greatness of their native city higher than the salvation of their souls." 67 That may be a bit extreme. But Weber's more general thesis is not: the person who has a vocation for politics must understand that politics is (ultimately and potentially) a violent practice and "he lets himself in for the diabolic forces lurking in all violence. … He who seeks the salvation of his soul, of his own and of others, should not seek it along the avenue of politics." 68 This is not the place to embark on a general consideration of the problem of dirty hands. My invocation of Machiavelli and Weber is intended just to illustrate the point that the justification of an action may not be all there is to be said about the character of those who undertake it.
Anyway, I should emphasis it is not my intention in this paper to assess the character of the persons who actually engage in these killings. No doubt there are things to be said on this front. With regard (say) to regular military operations and with regard to executions, it is possible to say of those who engage in stateauthorized killings that they are men not murderers. It may not be so easy to say this of the members of death squads, even when circumstances have driven a country to use death squads and even when killing by death squads appears justified. The tinge of something like murder and assassination may be present and not altogether displaced by the justifications we concoct or the reasons we manufacture for not using these terms. 69 What interests me, however, is the character of the state that authorizes these operations not the character of the killers themselves.
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I raised the difference between virtue ethics on the one hand, and consequentialist or deontological justification on the other. We don't usually talk about the virtues of states; but we do talk about their character. We do often 68 Ibid., pp. 125-6. See also the consideration of Weber's position in Walzer, "Political Action," pp. 176-7. 69 I can't resist mentioning , however, the observation of Immanuel Kant in §57 of "The Doctrine of Right" (6: 347) in The Metaphysics of Morals (1797), trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 154-who wrote A state against which war is being waged is permitted to use any means of defense except those that would make its subjects unfit to be citizens…. Means of defense that are not permitted include using its own subjects as … assassins or poisoners (among whom socalled snipers, who lie in wait to ambush individuals, might well be classed)…. Obviously these are not all value-neutral terms, but nor are the derogatory connotations of some of them simply the result of the performance of unjustified actions by state in question. They have to do with ethos and character and fundamental aims and pervasive principles of organization. I think it is worth dwelling on these characterizations when they become available or when it becomes plausible to apply them to a state in which we are interested (or implicated).
At the birth of political theory, states were classified in terms of their political structure and in terms of their quality. Aristotle distinguished rule by one person, rule by the few, and rule by the many, and he cross-hatched that in a threeby-two matrix in terms of whether they were good or bad: so we had monarchy and tyranny, aristocracy and oligarchy, and polity and democracy-the last of these being often a term of abuse. 71 Aristotle also considered the possibility of a further dimension according to whether any of these forms involved rule by law. A couple of thousand years later, Montesquieu essayed a set of broad classifications, partly formal and partly sociological. 72 He distinguished republics, monarchies, and despotisms; among republics, he distinguished democracies and aristocracies; and in general he added a distinction depending on whether the constitution of a state was "moderate" or not. But not only that-he invited us to consider also the principle or animating ethos of each form: virtue in a republic; honor in a monarchy; and fear in a despotism. Montesquieu never really aligned these characterizations directly with moral evaluation-except perhaps in the case of despotism. But they were certainly put forward as significant, and significant not just for social science but for the citizens or subjects of the regimes involved. It was something for them to ponder or reflect upon. 71 Aristotle, The Politics, Bks. III and IV.
In my view, the use of death lists and death squads changes (or complicates) the character of our state (the United States) so far as the use of lethal force is concerned. And it is worth contemplating as such. It does so, even if the justifications discussed in the previous section go through. For even if there is a military/laws-of-war justification, the use of death squads is a different kind of operation from the combat operations we are used to. Or even if the use of death squads is intended as "rough justice," it is a radical departure from the business of trying and punishing terrorists and insurgents and those who organize terrorism or insurgency as criminals. Or even if, as Kenneth Anderson maintains, it is simply our country's means of "naked self-defense," it is a reflection upon the threat posed by terrorism that we have been driven to this defensive expedient. Our country-considered as a political system that uses and regulates the use of lethal force-has changed its character in these and other ways.
Lethal Force and the Character of the State
We owe to Max Weber the proposition that states are to be defined as such by reference to the force that they monopolize. They can't be defined functionally:
Sociologically, the state cannot be defined in terms of its ends. There is scarcely any task that some political association has not taken in hand, and there is no task that one could say has always been exclusive and peculiar to those associations which are designated as political ones…. Ultimately, one can define the modern state sociologically only in terms of the specific means peculiar to it, as to every political association, namely, the use of physical force.
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States have to be defined modally, in terms of the way they carry out whatever tasks they take on. "If no social institutions existed which knew the use of violence, then the concept of 'state' would be eliminated…." In the past all sorts of organizations claimed the right to use force in pursuit of their own aims. But " [t] oday the relation between the state and violence is an especially intimate one," because the state purports to control all such legitimation of violence. "A state," says Weber, "is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory." 74 In his great work, Economy and Society, published originally in 1921, Weber added the following qualification:
It goes without saying that the use of physical force is neither the sole, nor even the most usual, method of administration of political organizations. On the contrary, their heads have employed all conceivable means to bring about their ends. But, at the same time, the threat of force, and in the case of need its actual use, is the method which is specific to political organizations and is always the last resort when others have failed.
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Notice that 'physical force" here can cover a variety of phenomena from pushing, shoving, and "kettling," 76 through incarceration, all the way to killing (the use of deadly force). Though he refers to force of all kinds, we might be particularly interested in that aspect of Weber's conception that refers to lethal force. We might want to say, in particular, that a state is an organization that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of lethal force within a given territory. Under the auspices of this conception, one might begin categorizing states according to the way or the various ways in which it governs, regulates, and authorizes the use of lethal force: how exactly does it legitimize the use of deadly force? The United States does this under legal auspices in a number of ways:
(1) Under the most stringent conditions, ordinary people and law enforcement officers are permitted and authorized to use deadly force in defense of themselves or others in the face of an imminent threat to their own or others' lives. and pursuant to a judicial order following a criminal trial, with all sorts of safeguards and appellate opportunities.
(3) The state may authorize the use of military force in combat against enemy combatants in a war, but strictly pursuant to the privileges and under the strict regulation of the laws of armed conflict.
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In this package of possibilities, the modern state reveals itself in its broadly ruleof-law character. The rule of law is thought particularly important where death is involved. It remains a Weberian entity, with deadly force available as a last resort, but the use of that force is highly regulated by familiar bodies of law. Some modern states reject (2), although they may reserve the right to resurrect the death penalty should it be needed or demanded by their citizenry. Be that as it may, these three conditions together define a particular kind or character of state on the basis of how the use of deadly force is regulated.
Some have worried that the availability of large numbers of nuclear weapons to states like ours has changed their character somewhat, so far as the use of lethal force is concerned. In a recent book Elaine Scarry expresses concern about the emergence of "thermonuclear monarchy"-a situation in which, in countries like Britain and the United States, one or a very small number of officials are empowered to authorize the release of large numbers of nuclear weapons which will have the effect of incinerating or irradiating tens or hundreds of millions of people, mainly civilians.
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(4) Our head of state, acting on his or her own initiative, 79 has the power to authorize the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs)-nuclear weapons-against civilian as well as military populations. We retain 77 We might possibly want to distinguish also between versions of (3) that privilege citizen militias and versions that privilege standing professional armies. This, she argues, is a drastic change in the character and posture of powerful modern democracies, so far as dealing with death is concerned. We ourselves recognize that the development or acquisition of WMD betokens a massive change in the character of other states when they get them. They have become like us (though usually with a much smaller arsenal), and we worry that their leaders cannot be trusted to exercise the uncompelled restraint which our leaders have exercised since 1945. This is not the place to discuss Professor Scarry's concern. I put it forward here as another example of how a state may change its character in relation to the use of deadly force. My claim in this paper is that our present practice of making official lists of people who are to be killed and authorizing small squads of military and intelligence people to hunt them down and kill them also represents a new kind of relation between the state-in this case the United States-and its definitive power of authorizing lethal force.
(5) The state maintains lists of individuals who are designated as enemies of the state, whose continued existence is thought seriously adverse to the interests of the state, and from time to time names are taken from these lists and their bearers are hunted down and killed by squads of military and intelligence people dedicated to that mission.
It is not unprecedented for states to operate in this way. My intention in taking advantage of the ugly connotations of the language of "death lists" and "death squads" is to draw abrupt attention to that point. We are not the first to go down this path of the state maintaining lists of enemies to be "eliminated." But it is a terrifying path.
We saw in the previous section that attempts have been made to justify targeted killing by assimilating it to the exercise of state powers (1) through (3). I argued in the previous section that even if these arguments succeed on a narrow justificatory front-and it is by no means clear that they do-they do not settle the question of whether a new form of state control of deadly force is emerging here.
That's what is helpful in our inquiry-by analogy-about (4), the acquisition of WMDs. Although (4) arises out of (3), i.e. out of the military context, it is pretty evident that it also represents a dramatically new development in the character of the states that have this capacity. The main use of (4)-from 1950s through the 1980s, the threat to use nuclear weapons as a deterrent against their use by other states-has required a threat to murder by incineration and irradiation huge numbers of civilians in enemy cities. Everyone hoped the threat would never have to be carried out. But its character and its logic differed so radically from ordinary military operations that it needed to be understood as involving a distinct relation between the state and deadly force.
Well, similarly, even if the use of death lists and death squads arises out of (3) or even if it is-as Professor Biggar believes-a rough form of (2), it is in itself still sui generis as a form of state involvement with death. We don't ordinarily make lists of named individuals in the course of combat; and although we do execute named individuals in criminal cases we do so after processes of trial and arrays of safeguards that have no equivalent whatever in the case of targeted killing. Even in the lines of justification that attempt to connect targeted killing with (1)-the privilege of killing in self-defense-what we find in fact are tendentious attempts to revise the logic of "imminence" to make available the sort of targeted killing we have made provision for. 80 In general, then, attempts to cabin (5) within categories (1) or (2) or (3), involve a great deal of pushing and shoving and misconception and distortion. Moreover, suppose we were considering the relation between classic death squads on the Salvadorian model, and possibilities (1), (2), and (3). I don't think we would countenance for a moment any argument that the use of death lists and death squads could be put into any of these three categories. Classic death squad practice would strike us as a distinct form-and a distinctively disreputable form-of the relation between state and deadly force. We should have to have something like (5) available anyway to account for the distinctive character of those operations. And then my point is that once (5) is available, it is at the very least an open question whether our practices of targeted killing should be put into that category rather than squeezed in category (1) or (2) or (3). 81 This analysis has been rather formalistic. Is it important that our state has taken on this new character, that it has added (5), targeted killing, to its other modes of organizing and regulating the use of lethal force?
I don't want to say that it is the most important characterological trait or that it overwhelms all other interests in the sort of state we have. As we saw in section 6 there are all sorts of ways in which the character of the state can be described. Weber didn't think that the state as such could be described in terms of its ends, but certainly the character of the modern American state as a welfare state and a regulatory state is massively important, and more important certainly than the character of its regulation of lethal force.
Nevertheless characterizing the state's use and regulation of lethal force is important. And the use of lethal force under heading (5) is itself quite important within that category. Targeted killings by the United States number in the thousands. 82 We put to death through targeted killing more people than are executed pursuant to judicial order in the United States. And there are many more targeted killings than there are other kinds of justified homicides in self-defense.
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As for combat casualties inflicted by our forces (apart from targeted killings), the numbers are much higher: a half million or more in Iraq alone since 2003. On the other hand, the statistics on targeted killing are in the same order of magnitude as the combat deaths that American forces have suffered in this conflict. These statistics are not conclusive of anything except that targeted killing is not a minor or inconsiderable aspect of the state's use and regulation of lethal force. It is up there with the other killings that our government authorizes and commands.
